

THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY IN UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Kateryna Tiashkorob
National Technical University of Ukraine
“Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”
Kyiv, Ukraine
katushkajordison98@gmail.com
<https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7215-0951>

Abstract. *The article examines the constitutional foundations of the presidency in Ukraine and outlines the prospects for its reform in the context of current political and legal challenges. The relevance of the study is stipulated by the need to improve the balance of powers in a parliamentary-presidential republic, to strengthen democratic control over the activities of the Head of State and to ensure the stability of the constitutional order. The purpose of the study is to analyze the constitutional status of the President of Ukraine, his powers and interaction with other state authorities, and to identify areas for possible reforms based on national experience and European standards. The methodological basis is formed by systemic, comparative legal, historical and legal, and formal legal methods which allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the presidency and the practice of its functioning. As a result, it is established that the institution of the presidency in Ukraine is in a state of functional imbalance, which is manifested in the instability of the form of government, contradictions in the distribution of powers and political conflict. The experience of other countries, in particular France, Poland and Lithuania, shows that mixed models can function effectively provided that the role of the president in the system of government is clearly regulated. The author concludes that it is expedient to carry out a constitutional reform aimed at improving the institution of the presidency by clarifying its powers, introducing effective accountability mechanisms and ensuring institutional balance in the system of state power.*

Keywords: President of Ukraine, constitutional reform, parliamentary-presidential republic, balance of power, separation of powers, constitutional law

INTRODUCTION

The institution of the presidency in Ukraine remains one of the most politically significant and, at the same time, most controversial elements of the national constitutional architecture. Since independence, presidential power has played a key role in shaping public policy, acting both as a stabilizing factor in periods of political turbulence and as a source of institutional imbalance in relations between the branches of government (Choudri et al., 2018).

Despite the proclaimed parliamentary-presidential format, in practice, over the past three decades, there have been constant fluctuations between tendencies to concentrate power in the hands of the head of state and attempts to limit his influence through constitutional and political mechanisms. In the context of post-Soviet transformation, systemic crises, threats to national security, and Ukraine's desire to build a stable democracy, the role of the President of Ukraine has become particularly important. As the guarantor of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine, and the rights and freedoms of citizens, the President is an important figure called upon to ensure both internal political stability and the representation of the state at the international level (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). That

is why the relevance of researching the constitutional foundations of the institution of the presidency and its reform is beyond doubt, especially in the context of the intensification of state renewal processes caused by full-scale war and the need to adapt the national system of government to European standards (Zelinska, 2006).

The prerequisites for researching this topic are formed in the context of Ukraine's long-standing search for an optimal model of state power organization that would combine democratic legitimacy, effective governance, and the prevention of excessive concentration of power in one hand. Since 1991, the institution of the presidency has undergone significant changes: from a presidential form of government to a parliamentary-presidential one and back again, depending on the political situation and the decisions of the Constitutional Court. The constitutional reforms of 2004, 2010, and 2014 testify to the instability and inconsistency of the model in which the President of Ukraine functions in a complex system of checks and balances, which often proves ineffective or too conflictual (Zelenko, 2021).

The problem stems from the fact that the current status and powers of the President of Ukraine in the system of state authorities do not always comply with the principles of a parliamentary-presidential republic, which are formally enshrined in the Constitution. Despite the existence of constitutional norms that define the limits of the President's powers, in practice, there is a broad interpretation of these norms, which sometimes leads to the political domination of the head of state and conflicts with other branches of government — primarily with the government and parliament. In addition, the institution of the presidency often becomes the object of personification of power, which contradicts the principles of institutional stability and constitutional order.

In Ukraine's recent history, the institution of the presidency has been at the epicenter of key political crises — from the constitutional reform of 2004 and its repeal in 2010, to the events of the Revolution of Dignity and the Russian Federation's military invasion in 2014 and 2022. In these conditions, the issues of the limits of presidential powers, the forms of accountability of the head of state, and the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness have become particularly important.

The growing public demand for democratic accountability, the threat of excessive personalisation of power, and the course towards European integration highlight the need for a deeper analysis of the nature of the presidency as an institution of constitutional democracy.

In the scientific literature (Zelinska, 2006; Lytvyn, 2014; Zelenko, 2021; Radchuk, 2021) , considerable attention is paid to the theoretical and legal analysis of presidential power, but in the Ukrainian context, a coherent concept of the presidency that clearly corresponds to the principles of constitutional democracy has not yet been formed. Gaps in scientific discourse are related, in particular, to insufficient consideration of political practice, the relationship between legal norms and their actual application, as well as underestimation of the influence of external political dynamics and military factors on the evolution of presidential powers.

Today, amid ongoing war, reconstruction challenges, and the need for effective public administration, the discussion on revising the role of the president in the system of government is of particular importance (Naboka & Dzhuylyay). Should the institution of the presidency remain the dominant center of the political process? Or, conversely, should we return to a model of stricter parliamentary control with limited presidential functions? The answer to these questions requires not only legal analysis, but also consideration of the broader political context, national experience, and international standards of democracy.

The purpose of this article is to define the constitutional foundations of the institution of the presidency in Ukraine, identify problematic aspects of its functioning, and propose conceptual approaches to reforming this institution, taking into account current political realities and democratic requirements.

The main objectives of the study are: 1) characterizing the historical evolution of presidential power in Ukraine; 2) assessing the current constitutional regulation of the President's powers; 3) identifying contradictions between the formal model and actual practice; 4) summarizing European experience

regarding the status of the head of state; 5) justifying the need for and directions of reforming the institution of the presidency.

The research hypothesis is that the existing model of the presidency in Ukraine does not comply with the principles of balanced democracy, creates risks of concentration of power, and requires a conceptual review in order to establish a clearer distribution of powers, increase accountability, and introduce effective control mechanisms. The article will be of interest to a wide range of scholars, constitutionalists, political analysts, and practitioners involved in the constitutional process and public policy-making, as it combines in-depth legal analysis with the current political context and a forward-looking vision of reform.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF THE PRESIDENCY IN UKRAINE

The presidency in Ukraine has a complex legal and political nature, which is determined by constitutional provisions and the peculiarities of the functioning of the system of power in a parliamentary-presidential republic. The 1996 Constitution of Ukraine established the status of the President of Ukraine as the head of state, who embodies state unity, guarantees state sovereignty, territorial integrity, compliance with the Constitution, the rights and freedoms of citizens, and ensures the functioning of state power and its continuity (Article 102).

According to the Basic Law, the President does not belong to any of the three branches of government in the narrow functional sense, although in fact he performs functions on the borderline between the executive, legislative, and even judicial spheres (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). This status of the President — “above the government” or “arbitrator” — was the result of a compromise during the constitutional process of the 1990s and was intended to serve as a check and balance. However, in political practice, it often created the conditions for an imbalance in the system of government.

The President of Ukraine has a range of powers covering the executive, legislative, and, to some extent, judicial spheres. In the executive sphere, the President effectively acts as co-chair of the executive branch, although formally he or she only heads the state, not the government. In particular, the President appoints the Prime Minister (with the consent of parliament), nominates candidates for key government positions, appoints heads of regional and district state administrations, chairs the National Security and Defense Council, and is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Averchuk, n.d.). Through these powers, the head of state influences national security strategy, foreign policy, and the personnel configuration of the executive branch. In the legislative sphere, the president does not have direct legislative initiative, but he does have important functions of influence over parliament: he can veto laws, address the Verkhovna Rada with messages, convene extraordinary sessions, and, in certain cases, terminate the powers of parliament ahead of schedule (Yarema, 2014). In the judicial sphere, the President also plays a role in forming the composition of judicial bodies, in particular the Constitutional Court, and appoints judges of general jurisdiction upon the recommendation of the High Council of Justice, which is essential for the implementation of the principle of independence of the judicial branch (Averchuk, n.d.).

A distinctive feature of the Ukrainian model is the dualism of executive power, which manifests itself in the coexistence of the powers of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers. This structure often leads to inter-institutional conflicts, particularly in cases of political incompatibility between the President and the parliamentary majority. Despite the formal parliamentary-presidential form of government, the real political weight of the President depends on his influence on parliament and the government. This creates risks of concentration of power in the hands of the head of state, especially in a state of martial law, when the powers of the President are significantly expanded. Thus, the balance of power in Ukraine has not only constitutional and legal implications, but also political and practical implications, which vary depending on the political context and personal factors (Yosypovych & Andrusyshyn, 2018).

The constitutional model of the presidency provides both guarantees of the independence of the head of state and mechanisms for his accountability. The guarantees include a fixed term of office (five years

with the possibility of one re-election), special immunity, and a ban on combining the presidency with other types of activity. At the same time, the Constitution establishes a complex procedure for removing the President from office through impeachment, which requires the initiation of a parliamentary investigation, conclusions from the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, and the adoption of a decision by at least three-quarters of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada. Other grounds for early termination of powers include resignation, inability to perform duties due to health reasons (as determined by the Constitutional Court), and death of the head of state. In practice, these mechanisms are either extremely complicated or have not been used in practice, which creates additional challenges for effective democratic control over the activities of the President (Vegesh, 2008).

In general, the constitutional model of the presidency in Ukraine, despite its normative logic of ensuring the balance of powers and stability of governance, is characterized by a high degree of political variability, unclear division of functions, and insufficiently effective accountability mechanisms. This necessitates a review and update of this model, taking into account European constitutional standards, the need to strengthen parliamentary control, and to ensure a real, rather than declarative, balance of powers.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY IN UKRAINE

Since Ukraine declared independence, the presidency has undergone significant transformations, reflecting both the evolution of the constitutional model of the state and the struggle for power between various political actors. In 1991–1996, Ukraine functioned de facto as a presidential republic, although the absence of a full-fledged constitution and a developed system of checks and balances led to institutional instability. The president played a dominant role in forming the government, directly influenced the legislative process, and coordinated the main directions of domestic and foreign policy. The constitutional process was accompanied by heated discussions about the model of government between supporters of the presidential and parliamentary-presidential forms (Vegesh, 2008). As a result, the 1996 Constitution enshrined a mixed model that legally declared the separation of powers but in fact left the president with broad opportunities to influence the executive branch, in particular through the mechanism of appointing the head of government and local administration leaders.

The 2004 constitutional reform was an attempt to limit the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the President and introduce a more balanced model of a parliamentary-presidential republic. Its implementation was directly linked to the events of the Orange Revolution and political agreements aimed at defusing socio-political tensions (Danylyuk, 2015). As a result, the procedure for forming the government was changed—the Prime Minister was appointed by parliament on the recommendation of the President, who no longer had the right to single-handedly determine the key composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. The role of the parliamentary coalition increased, and the Verkhovna Rada's control over the executive branch was strengthened. Although these changes were not accompanied by a full redistribution of powers in the system of state administration, they marked the beginning of a transition to a new model of power interaction, in which the President was to act more as an arbitrator and guarantor than as an active participant in executive activities.

However, in 2010, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine issued a controversial decision declaring the 2004 reform unconstitutional and reinstating the 1996 version of the Constitution (Voychuk, 2019). This decision was made without a parliamentary vote and raised numerous legal and political concerns, particularly regarding its legitimacy and compliance with the principles of the rule of law. In effect, there was a return to the presidential-parliamentary model, which allowed the head of state to once again concentrate a significant amount of power in his hands, particularly in the area of government formation. This situation contributed to the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies, the weakening of parliamentary control, and the erosion of the principle of separation of powers.

After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decided to reinstate the 2004 version of the Constitution, effectively returning to a parliamentary-presidential form of government. This

step was intended to restore constitutional balance, reduce the risks of usurpation of power, and ensure a more stable democratic model of governance. At the same time, the changes took place in the context of a deep political and security crisis, which significantly influenced the interpretation of the role of the President in the system of government. (On the self-removal of the President of Ukraine from the exercise of constitutional powers and the appointment of early presidential elections in Ukraine: Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 757-VII of February 22, 2014 URL:)

In the post-revolutionary period, the President of Ukraine retained significant political influence, despite the reduction of his formal powers. This was due, in particular, to the international activity of the head of state, his leading role in the field of security and defense, as well as his authority in society against the backdrop of a hybrid war with Russia. This situation demonstrated that legal restrictions on presidential powers do not automatically reduce the political weight of the institution of the presidency. Instead, in conditions of threats to statehood, society tends to delegate additional informal powers to the president, perceiving him as the embodiment of unity and the defender of national interests. This duality — formal limitation and actual dominance — requires deeper reflection in the context of the further transformation of the Ukrainian model of presidency.

The latest stage in the evolution of the presidency in Ukraine is taking place amid a full-scale war that began in 2022. The introduction of martial law has granted the president expanded powers in accordance with Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law. In particular, the President was given the right to issue decrees having the force of law, exercise overall command of the defense forces, coordinate the activities of all executive bodies in the field of security and defense, and make decisions on general mobilization and military command. These conditions have enhanced the role of the President as the *de facto* head of state, particularly in terms of strategic management and international diplomacy (Khomienko, 2022).

However, the strengthening of presidential power in an emergency situation has raised a number of legal and political challenges. First, martial law has shifted the balance of power in favor of the executive branch, with parliament playing a less active role in controlling the actions of the President and the government. Second, the lack of clear time limits for the validity of certain presidential decrees in wartime creates the risk of prolonging emergency powers and turning temporary mechanisms into permanent ones. Third, under martial law, the normal political process, including elections, has been virtually halted, which could lead to constitutional uncertainty regarding the term of office of the head of state (Dorontseva, 2022). Therefore, the current stage of development of the institution of the presidency requires not only legal guarantees of stability in wartime, but also the design of models that will ensure a return to a full-fledged constitutional order after the end of hostilities without compromising democratic principles.

KEY PROBLEMS IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PRESIDENCY

The presidency in Ukraine has long functioned in conditions of political and legal tension arising from conflicts between the branches of government and the unclear distribution of powers within the mixed form of government. One of the key problems is the constant conflicts between the President, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet of Ministers, which arise at both the institutional and personal levels. The lack of a coordinated mechanism for interaction between the head of state and the government often leads to the blocking of political processes, competition for influence in key areas of public policy, and mutual delegitimization of institutions. Examples of such conflicts include prolonged confrontations over the appointment of the government, personnel decisions in the security sector, and the implementation of foreign policy, where the line between the powers of the president and the executive branch remains blurred (Kondratenko, 2023).

A mixed or dualistic form of government formally provides for a balance between presidential and parliamentary elements. However, in the Ukrainian context, this model creates more challenges than

advantages. On the one hand, it allows for a certain flexibility in the formation of the executive branch and creates the possibility for a balance of influence between different political forces. On the other hand, this form of government often causes institutional uncertainty, especially in conditions of coalition instability or situations where the president and parliament represent different political camps. In such cases, there is not only a decline in the effectiveness of governance, but also an erosion of the constitutional order due to constant attempts to reinterpret the distribution of powers (Yosypovych D., Andrusyshyn R., 2018).

Another problem is either the excessive concentration of powers in the President in certain areas (especially security and defense) or, conversely, the lack of clearly defined mechanisms for the implementation of presidential functions, which makes them dependent on political expediency. For example, the President has a decisive influence on the appointment of law enforcement leadership, but his role in shaping government policy is limited under the Constitution. At the same time, practice shows that presidents often use informal levers of influence that are not regulated by law but rely on party or oligarchic support. This situation creates a duality in the legal status of the head of state, turning him into a superstructure with ambivalent powers.

The personalization of power in Ukraine also poses a threat to the effective functioning of the presidency. Political campaigns are mostly built around the figure of a specific candidate, rather than an ideological platform or program. After being elected, the president often forms a vertical power structure based on personal loyalty rather than institutional competence. This increases the political dependence of the executive branch, reduces the effectiveness of public administration, and contributes to the emergence of clan-oligarchic systems. Such personalization of power contradicts the principles of democracy, where institutions should be more important than political personalities.

In addition, the balance between the branches of power in Ukraine remains vulnerable to changes in the political situation. A change in political course, the formation of a new coalition, or the election of a new president often leads to a review of the practice of interaction between government institutions, even without formal changes to the Constitution. This indicates the instability of the constitutional model, which requires strengthening institutional autonomy and clearly establishing mechanisms for interaction between the president, parliament, and government. Otherwise, the system of state power will continue to depend on situational political agreements, which undermines the predictability and stability of the constitutional order.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

In the process of improving the institution of the presidency in Ukraine, it is advisable to refer to foreign experience, which allows comparing the effectiveness of different models of government organization and the possibilities of their adaptation to the Ukrainian political and legal context. One of the most discussed models for Ukraine is the semi-presidential model of France, which combines a strong presidential vertical with parliamentary accountability of the government. The French president has significant powers in the areas of foreign policy, defense, and government formation, but at the same time interacts with the prime minister, who is accountable to parliament. This model demonstrates the potential for ensuring political stability in conditions of political harmony between institutions, but at the same time carries the risk of so-called "cohabitation" conflict in the event of political disagreement between the president and the parliamentary majority (). For Ukraine, the French example may be useful in balancing the influence of the head of state and the government, but it needs to be adapted to take into account the weak party system and the high degree of personalisation of power.

The experience of Poland and Lithuania is particularly relevant for Ukraine, as these countries, like Ukraine, have undergone post-Soviet transformation of public administration and have built democratic institutions practically from scratch. Both states have implemented mixed models of government with a division of powers between the president, the government, and the parliament, giving the head of state a representative and coordinating function and strengthening the role of the prime minister. In both cases,

the president has influence in the areas of foreign policy and national security, but does not directly control the executive branch. An important difference is that Poland has a system of checks and balances with a strong Constitutional Tribunal and clear boundaries between the branches of government, which reduces the risk of usurpation. For Ukraine, the Lithuanian and Polish models may be valuable due to their practice of gradually delegating executive powers to the government and strengthening democratic procedures while preserving the President's arbitration role.

The opposite of semi-presidential models is the experience of Germany, which functions as a classic parliamentary republic. The German president is elected by the Federal Assembly and performs mainly ceremonial functions without taking an active part in the political process. The center of political power lies with the Bundestag and the government headed by the chancellor. This model ensures the stability of state governance, minimizes the risks of political personalization, and increases the accountability of the executive branch to parliament. At the same time, the application of the German model in Ukraine currently seems utopian due to the weak level of party institutionalization, the instability of parliamentary coalitions, and the significant public role of the president. However, certain elements — such as parliamentary control over the government and restrictions on the political influence of the president — could serve as a guide for reforming the Ukrainian model toward greater predictability and legal certainty.

The American model of presidency, which is an example of a classic presidential republic, is often cited in academic literature as an example of institutional balance of power with significant presidential powers. In the US, the head of state also heads the executive branch, is commander-in-chief, and has the right to veto bills. At the same time, a system of strict checks and balances, an independent judiciary, and a bicameral Congress ensure a high level of accountability and transparency. However, adapting this model to Ukrainian conditions is practically impossible due to historical, cultural, and institutional differences. Ukraine has neither a two-party system nor mature legal traditions that would ensure the effective functioning of such strong presidential power without the risk of usurpation. At the same time, certain elements, such as the independence of the judicial system, the accountability of government officials, and the publicity of decision-making processes, can be integrated into Ukrainian practice to enhance transparency and institutional stability.

Summarizing foreign experience, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of the presidency depends not so much on the formal distribution of powers as on the quality of institutional culture, the level of political accountability, and the functioning of the system of checks and balances. The French, Polish, Lithuanian, and German models demonstrate different approaches to the division of powers between the president, the government, and the parliament, each of which has its own advantages and risks. The American presidential system, although not directly transferable to the Ukrainian context, offers valuable institutional mechanisms that can be used to strengthen democratic governance. Ukraine needs not to blindly copy the experience of others, but to carefully borrow best practices, taking into account its own historical specificity, political culture, and security challenges.

PROSPECTS FOR REFORMING THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY IN UKRAINE

The prospects for reforming the institution of the presidency in Ukraine are determined by both internal political contradictions and external challenges related to the security crisis, threats to the constitutional order, and the need to strengthen institutional stability. One of the key areas for possible reform is a clear regulatory division of powers between the President and the Cabinet of Ministers. The current model, which combines features of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, produces conflicts in the areas of foreign policy, personnel appointments, and control over the executive branch. The introduction of effective checks and balances, in particular the expansion of parliamentary control over the President's

actions and the limitation of the head of state's influence on the judicial system and the Security Service of Ukraine, is a necessary condition for strengthening the democratic model of governance.

Particular attention should be paid to reducing the executive powers of the president, which will avoid dualism in the sphere of government competences. In this context, it seems appropriate to remove the president from the executive branch, leaving him with the functions of arbitrator, guarantor of the constitution, and international representative of the state. At the same time, reform should also cover the procedure for electing the President — for example, by reducing the role of political parties in shaping pre-election strategies, improving electoral legislation, and making it more difficult to manipulate election campaigns. Accountability mechanisms, such as impeachment, need to be simplified and more clearly regulated in order to be effectively applied, rather than merely existing in name only.

A separate issue is the revision of constitutional provisions on the status of the president in a state of martial law. The extraordinary powers of the head of state in crisis situations must be balanced by appropriate legal restrictions and time limits in order to avoid the concentration of power in one person's hands and prevent backsliding from democratic standards. In this sense, constitutional reform should provide for clear safeguards against the extension of the President's powers beyond the prescribed term under the guise of a state of emergency.

The debate on the advisability of transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary republic has been going on for several decades. Among the arguments in favor are strengthening the institutional accountability of parliament and the government to society, avoiding the concentration of power, and reducing the risks of authoritarianism and usurpation. At the same time, opponents of such a move warn against excessive fragmentation of the political field, the risk of coalition instability, government weakness in crisis situations, and difficulties in implementing foreign policy. Ukrainian political experience shows that weak parties and political polarization can create an ineffective parliamentary republic, which requires prior strengthening of the party system and electoral culture.

At various times in Ukraine, proposals for deep constitutional reform have been put forward by academics, experts, and temporary advisory bodies. The ideas of a constitutional convention, which were discussed after the Revolution of Dignity, envisaged a transition to a parliamentary form of government with clearly limited functions for the president as head of state, who is not part of the executive branch. Leading constitutionalists also emphasize the need to create a stable system of institutional control, an independent judiciary, and an effective system of checks and balances that can ensure not only the balance of power between the branches of government, but also citizens' trust in state institutions. In this context, the prospects for reforming the institution of the presidency should be viewed not as an isolated task, but as part of a large-scale reform of the system of governance in Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

Despite its central symbolic and political role, the institution of the presidency in Ukraine remains the subject of ongoing debate regarding its optimal structure and functional expediency within a mixed form of government. The study allows us to conclude that the current model of the presidency, enshrined in the 1996 Constitution and modified in 2004, 2010, and 2014, has proven vulnerable to political circumstances, creating conditions for periodic institutional conflicts, legal uncertainty, and the personalization of power. Despite the existence of accountability mechanisms, such as impeachment or early termination of powers, their complexity and political motivation do not contribute to real control over the President's activities.

Contemporary challenges to democratic development require a rethinking of the role of the head of state, taking into account the principle of separation of powers, strengthening institutional accountability, and strengthening the balance between the branches of government. Ukraine has the potential to introduce a new model of presidency that would guarantee stability, curb usurpation tendencies, and promote effective governance. In this context, it is important to take into account foreign experience, especially that of countries with a similar historical and political heritage, such as Poland or Lithuania, as

well as the flexible elements of France's semi-presidential system. At the same time, mechanically copying foreign models is unacceptable — reform must take into account the national context, political culture, and level of institutional maturity.

The practical significance of the study lies in outlining conceptual guidelines for future constitutional reform capable of strengthening the legitimacy of the presidency, ensuring the stability of the democratic system, and improving the quality of public administration. The recommended steps are: a clear normative distinction between the powers of the president and the government, simplification of accountability procedures, improvement of mechanisms for public and parliamentary control, and depoliticization of the functioning of the institution of the head of state.

Further research should focus on empirical analysis of the impact of the presidential model on the stability of the political regime, the effectiveness of government decisions, and the level of public trust in state institutions. Particular attention should be paid to issues of interaction between the president and civil society institutions, as well as the assessment of risks associated with the potential usurpation of power in conditions of security and martial law.

REFERENCES

- Averchuk, R. (n.d.). Political Explainer: Ukraine's System of Government. Retrieved from <https://voxukraine.org/cards/pravlinnya/index-en.html>
- Choudri, S., Sedelius, T., & Kyrychenko, Y. (2018). *Semi-presidentialism and inclusive governance in Ukraine: Proposals for constitutional reform*. Kyiv: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Constitution of Ukraine. Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80>
- Danyliuk, Y. V. (2015). Constitutional and legal aspects of the head of state institution: Domestic and foreign experience. *Scientific Notes of the Institute of Legislation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine*, (4), 21–26.
- Dorontseva, Y. (2022, June 20). State regulation during the war: How the President and MPs governed the country during the first 100 days of martial law. *Vox Ukraine*. Retrieved from <https://voxukraine.org/derzhavne-regulyuvannya-pid-chas-vijny>
- Khomenko, S. (2022, September 1). “A unified mobilized vertical”: What Ukrainian politics looks like six months after the start of the war. *BBC News Ukraine*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-62755736>
- Kondratenko, O. (2023). *Ukraine in Global Democracy Rankings*. Kyiv: Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NAS of Ukraine.
- Law on Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (2004). Retrieved from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/>
- Lytvyn, V. (2014). Evolution of the presidency in Ukraine's political history: Formation, powers, and role in the system of governance. Retrieved from https://filos.lnu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ukr.presid_ua.pdf
- Naboka, M., & Dzhulai, D. (2022). What can the president do on the first day in office? Retrieved from <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/shcho-mozhe-presydent-m-plus/29886991.html>
- On the Constitutional Submission of the President of Ukraine for Official Interpretation of Articles of the Law "On the Status of a People's Deputy of Ukraine": Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine No. 7-пп/2003 of April 10, 2003. Retrieved from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v007p710-03>

- On the Legal Regime of Martial Law: Law of Ukraine No. 389-VIII of May 12, 2015. Retrieved from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19>
- On the Suspension of the President of Ukraine from Exercising Constitutional Powers and the Appointment of Early Presidential Elections: Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 757-VII of February 22, 2014. Retrieved from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/757-18>
- Radchuk, O. (2021, October 30). The “Strong Hand” Theory: How to create an effective presidential republic in Ukraine. Slovo i Dilo. Retrieved from <https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2021/10/30/kolonka/aleksandr-radchuk/polityka/teoriya-sylnoyi-rukyyak-stvorytyefektyvnu-prezydentsku-respubliku-ukrayini>
- Vegesh, M. (2008). Political Science. Kyiv: Znannya.
- Voichuk, A. Y. (2019). The establishment and formation of the presidency in Ukraine. *European Political and Law Discourse*, 6(3), 54–60.
- Yarema, V. (2014). The President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers in the system of political decision-making. In H. Zelenko (Ed.), *Institutional Changes in the Political System of Contemporary Ukraine: Status and Directions of Optimization* (pp. 90–134). Kyiv: Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies.
- Yosypovych, D., & Andrusyshyn, R. (2018). Problems of reforming executive authorities in Ukraine. *Scientific Bulletin of Lviv State University of Internal Affairs. Legal Series*, 4, 143–152.
- Zelenko, H. (2016). The public administration system in Ukraine: Trajectory of changes in 2014–2016. *Scientific Notes of the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NAS of Ukraine*, (5–6), 4–34.
- Zelenko, H. (2021). The trajectory of political regime transformation in Ukraine since independence: Democracy vs. Oligarchic Clanism. In *Political Process in Independent Ukraine: Results and Problems* (pp. 139–176). Kyiv: Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NAS of Ukraine.
- Zelinska, M. (2006). The presidency in Ukraine in the context of constitutional reform. *Political Management*, 3, 114–123.
- Zelinska, M. I. (2010). Stages of transformation of the presidency in Ukraine. *Political Management*, 1, 68–72. Retrieved from https://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/zelinska_etapy.pdf