EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE AND RULE OF LAW: EVALUATING EXECUTIVE OVERREACH DURING NATIONAL SECURITY CRISES IN THE POST-PANDEMIC ERA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54658/ps.28153324.2026.15.1.pp.61-72Keywords:
state of exception, executive aggrandizement, democratic backsliding, proportionality principle, emergency governance, sunset clause, constitutional hardball, rule of law, post-pandemic governanceAbstract
The article in question explores how much emergency governance structures that were implemented during and after the COVID-19 pandemic have become institutionalized aspects of executive power in three jurisdictions that can be seen to represent three different types of regimes, including Germany (consolidated democracy), Kenya (transitioning state), and Hungary (illiberal regime). Using the theorisation of the so-called state of exception by Giorgio Agamben and the dictum of Carl Schmitt that he who declares the exception is the sovereign, the study utilizes qualitative content analysis of 274 executive decrees and 83 high-court decisions released between March 2020 and December 2025. These results indicate that there is a quantifiable tendency towards executive aggrandizement in all three cases, but the processes and the size are quite different. In consolidated democracies, the loss of judicial control is gradual and usually concealed by procedural adherence, in illiberal regimes it is explicit and supported by the institution, and in transitional states it is periodic but structurally disruptive. The article then ends with a suggestion of a compulsory framework of Sunset Clause, a legislative structure that mandates time-limited authorisation, a regular review of parliament, and the automatic lapse of all the powers related to security as a remedy to the normalisation of exceptional governance.
Downloads
References
Agamben, G. (2005). State of exception (K. Attell, Trans.). University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 2003)
Alexy, R. (2002). A theory of constitutional rights (J. Rivers, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
Barak, A. (2012). Proportionality: Constitutional rights and their limitations. Cambridge University Press.
Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0012
Edgell, A. B., Grahn, S., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A., & Maerz, S. F. (2021). Pandemic backsliding: Violations of democratic standards during Covid-19. Social Science & Medicine, 285, 114244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114244
Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. Z. (2018). How to save a constitutional democracy. University of Chicago Press.
Ginsburg, T., & Versteeg, M. (2021). The bound executive: Emergency powers during the pandemic. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 19(5), 1498–1535. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab059
Graziadei, M. (2003). The functionalist heritage. In P. Legrand & R. Munday (Eds.), Comparative legal studies: Traditions and transitions (pp. 100–127). Cambridge University Press.
Grogan, J. (2022). COVID-19, the rule of law and democracy: Analysis of legal responses to a global health crisis. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 14, 349–369. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-022-00168-8
Gross, O., & Ní Aoláin, F. (2006). Law in times of crisis: Emergency powers in theory and practice. Cambridge University Press.
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. (2021). Backsliding: Democratic regress in the contemporary world. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108957809
Halmai, G. (2024). Rule of law backsliding and memory politics in Hungary. European Constitutional Law Review, 19(4):602-622. doi:10.1017/S157401962300024X
International Commission of Jurists, Kenya Section. (2023). Shrinking space: Security legislation and civil liberties in Kenya, 2020–2023. ICJ Kenya.
Kelsen, H. (1967). Pure theory of law (M. Knight, Trans.). University of California Press. (Original work published 1934)
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. (2021). COVID-19 and human rights in Kenya: A monitoring report. KNCHR.
Kouroutakis, A., & Ranchordás, S. (2016). Snoozing democracy: Sunset clauses, de-juridification, and emergencies. Minnesota Journal of International Law, 25(1), 29–78.
Lazar, N. C. (2009). States of emergency in liberal democracies. Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. Crown.
Little, A. T., & Meng, A. (2024). Measuring democratic backsliding. PS: Political Science & Politics, 57(2), 149–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909652300063X
Mayring, P. (2014). Qualitative content analysis: Theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution. SSOAR. https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395173
Molloy, S. (2021). Emergency law responses to Covid-19 and the impact on peace and transition processes. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Morgenstern, S., & Pinto-Medeiros, A. (2025). Emergency without backsliding. Constitutional Political Economy. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-025-09493-0
Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. Wiley-Interscience.
Scheppele, K. L. (2018). Autocratic legalism. University of Chicago Law Review, 85(2), 545–583.
Schmitt, C. (2005). Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty (G. Schwab, Trans.). University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1922)
Smet, S., & Brems, E. (2023). When human rights clash at the European Court of Human Rights: Conflict or harmony? Oxford University Press.
Szente, Z. (2025). How to assess rule-of-law violations in a state of emergency? Towards a general analytical framework. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 17, 117–138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00244-1
Szente, Z. (2024). Emergency as a pretext for restricting political rights: The Hungarian autocratic regime at work. In M. Florczak-Wątor et al. (Eds.), States of emergency and human rights protection (pp. 187–199). Routledge.
Tushnet, M. (2004). Constitutional hardball. John Marshall Law Review, 37(2), 523–553.
Vyhnánek, L., Boháček, M., Kosaг, D., & Petrov, J. (2024). The dynamics of proportionality: Constitutional courts and the review of COVID-19 regulations. German Law Journal, 25(3), 386–406. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.96
Šišková, N. (2024). Proportionality during times of crisis: Precautionary application of proportionality analysis in the judicial review of emergency measures. European Constitutional Law Review, 20(1), 27–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019624000051
Vékony, A. (2024). Confused constitutionalism in Hungary—New assessment criteria for recognising a populist constitutional court. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00239-y
Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018). Unwelcome change: Coming to terms with democratic backsliding. Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 93–113. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628
Aydin-Cakir, A. (2024). The varying effect of court-curbing: Evidence from Hungary and Poland. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(6), 1179–1205. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2171089
Won, Y. (2025). Emergency powers and COVID-19 derogations, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 23(1), 113–147, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaf010
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Mariya Petrova
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
