PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGES OF ENHANCED EU INFORMATION SHARING: THE CASE OF BULGARIA

Abstract

Global trends and the ongoing dynamic processes of trans-border security threats necessitate an unprecedented intensification of intelligence sharing among European Union (EU) Member States, which also reflects on the strengthening of parliamentary oversight of intelligence services. These changes require the application of an integral approach to understanding potential risks and threats, in order to increase awareness and the effectiveness of parliamentary control over intelligence agencies. On one hand, enhanced cooperation in information exchange within the EU strengthens collective security, but simultaneously creates significant difficulties regarding the control and accountability of national intelligence services and institutions. This study demonstrates that overcoming these gaps can largely be achieved by increasing their effective monitoring and parliamentary oversight. This article aims to explore the models of parliamentary intelligence oversight and reveal the challenges they face under the conditions of intensive information exchange within the EU. A special focus is placed on Bulgarian parliamentary practice and its institutional framework. Through the case of Bulgaria, the article examines and reveals the paradoxes of parliamentary control in light of international obligations and requirements for democratic transparency. The research results indicate that current oversight models lag behind the networked nature of contemporary intelligence cooperation. Proposals are made to strengthen inter-parliamentary cooperation within the EU through information-sharing agreements.