ADVANTAGE IN OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE: A FORCE AMPLIFIER FOR UKRAINE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54658/ps.28153324.2026.16.2.pp.12-21Keywords:
intelligence, tactics, advantage, drones, Ukraine, warAbstract
The article analyses the core problems of intelligence superiority as a premise for prevailing in modern warfare. Addressing the problem in a situational context, related to the high-intensity war in Ukraine, the study defines the intangible non-material prerequisites Ukraine needs to pursue to achieve it. The article then highlights the key elements of intelligence advantage on a tactical and operational level and suggests avenues to further enhance and uphold it as a force amplifier for Ukraine. Moreover, these elements are identified as a set of interrelated and interdependent factors, stemming directly from the unified objectives of the overall battlefield engagement. The article argues that battlefield intelligence should be directed at countering the efforts of the adversary to gain tactical and operational surprise, disrupting their capacity to execute their tactical doctrine, thus denying them their preferred and prepared style of warfare. It goes on to explore the tools that intelligence structure may use to further empower the drone warfare. Furthermore, the article reveals specific avenues to transform the advantage in tactical and operational intelligence into decisive superiority through combining different, but interlinked intelligence priorities that trace a distinctive course of action ultimately leading to a breakthrough in the war. Finally, the study highlights several key requirements that would enable the Ukrainian intelligence system to unfold its potential as a force amplifier, including an upper hand in frontline intelligence technology, all-source data integration, enhancing the interlink between the net-centric approach and drone warfare, and elevating tactical and operational intelligence to the status of a strategic instrument.
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